Natural Rights and Positivism - Leo Strauss

May 12, 2022

In the last video, I discussed the relationship between historicism and natural right according to Leo Strauss. And showed the fruits that this relationship bears. However, I have not yet discussed the relationship between natural right and Positivism - another equally powerful enemy of natural right alongside Historicism.

In the last video, I have already defined the concept of a natural right and I will not go into this anymore. Here I am only going to reiterate the formulation offered by Strauss: “natural right claims to be a right that is discernible by human reason and is universally acknowledged” (Strauss, 1971, p. 9). Unlike historicism, which merely challenges natural rights universality, positivism singlehandedly denies any form of natural right considering it as something unscientific. This is because positivism assumes that conflict between different values or value systems is essentially insoluble for human reason. This is most evident in Max Weber’s work, which, according to Strauss, is the greatest representative of social science positivism. Considering procedures and methodology of natural sciences as its standard, positivist social sciences presumably banish any form of unempirical claims out of its field of expertise, especially - value judgments. Or as Strauss puts it, “the belief of positivism that value judgments are not subject to rational control, encourages inclination to make irresponsible assertions regarding right and wrong, good and bad” (Strauss, 1988, p. 23). Thus, in order to preserve its scientific status, social science aspires to make itself totally value-free or value-neutral.

This leads us to the core of positivism, namely, to the division or distinction between Facts and values. The social scientist claiming to be scientific i.e. positivist draws a sharp line between values and facts, regarding himself as unable to pass any value judgments (Strauss, 1991). Again, to borrow Weber’s position, social science can only answer questions of facts and their causes, but it is not competent to answer questions of value. Because, as Strauss remarks, “the absolute heterogeneity of facts and values necessitates the ethically neutral character of social science” (Strauss, 1971, p. 40). Because in the case of this absolute heterogeneity “no conclusion can be drawn from any fact as to its valuable character, nor can we infer the factual character of something from its being valuable or desirable” (Strauss, 1971, p. 39). It is another question whether such restriction (expectations) is realistic for social sciences?

This ethical neutrality of positivist social sciences results in total abandonment of Natural Rights. Presumably, it is considered as yet another value judgment on which social science cannot rely upon. Therefore, any right, according to positivism, is merely a positive right. This means that what is right is determined exclusively by the legislators and the courts of the various countries (Strauss, 1971). But none of the scientists, who hold this view, acknowledge the disastrous conclusions to, which their position leads. If all right is only a positive right this means that there is no transcultural and trans-historical standard, an ideal that is universal. But, instead, all societies have their own ideals and each is of equal value. Hence, if any principle is sufficiently justified by the fact that it is accepted by society, the principles of cannibalism are as defensible or sound as those of civilized life (Strauss, 1971). Or as Strauss puts it:

“Therefore, our believing in certain values cannot be traced beyond our decision or commitment. One might even say that, to the extent to which we are still able to reflect on the relation of our values to our situation, we are still trying to shirk the responsibility for our choice” (Strauss, 1991, p. 10).

In other words, there is no reasonable way to demonstrate the superiority of one value over another. We can merely persuade or indoctrinate people into preferring one value over another. However, at the end of the day, it is nothing but propaganda. Hence Isaiah Berlin remarks:

“To realize the relative validity of one’s convictions and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian” (Berlin, 1958, p. 51).

When there persists no universal value discernible by human reason, the single choice we are left with is to embrace the relative validity of our values. In short, rejection of natural right (or of value judgments in general) eventually leads to moral relativism.

However, here we ought to reiterate the aforementioned question: how realistic it is for social science to be faithful to its positivist ideal i.e. to reject any value judgment and limit itself to facts only? Strauss demonstrates four major considerations, which speak decisively about the theoretical weaknesses of social science positivism:

“It is impossible to study social phenomena i.e. all important social phenomena, without making value judgments… Because, generally speaking, it is impossible to understand thought or action without evaluating it” (Strauss, 1988, p. 21). Besides this, as Strauss ads, one must not overlook the invisible value judgments that are necessarily presupposed by any social scientist; value judgments of significant importance, yet often concealed from undiscerning eyes. For example, a fundamental distinction between “ethos” and "techniques of living (or “prudential” rules). Any sociologist must recognize and appreciate a distinctive character of an ethos (he is studying). But such appreciation necessarily implies a value judgment. The same may be said of morality, religion, politics, art, civilization, etc.
As we have already mentioned, “the rejection of value judgments is based on assumption that the conflict between different values or value-systems is essentially insoluble for human reason. But this assumption, while generally taken to be sufficiently established, has never been proven” (Strauss, 1988, p. 22).
Another reason, why positivists look down on value judgments, is their belief that scientific knowledge is the highest form of human knowledge. Because of this, they depreciate pre-scientific, common sense knowledge. However, this superstitious distrust towards pre-scientific knowledge fosters all sorts of sterile investigations or complicated idiocies. Futile discussions that eventually lead to nowhere. This is because any study in social science presupposes knowledge about basic common sense distinctions. “To illustrate this by the simplest example: all studies in social science presuppose that its devotees can tell human beings from other beings”. And everyone can agree that this fundamental knowledge was not acquired by them in classrooms; moreover “this knowledge is not transformed by social science into scientific knowledge, but retains its initial status without any modification throughout” (Strauss, 1988, p. 23). In other words, it never ascends from the status of pre-scientific knowledge to the status of scientific knowledge.
And finally, Positivism necessarily transforms itself into historicism. By virtue of its orientation by the model of natural science, social science is in danger of mistaking peculiarities of, say, mid-twentieth century United States, or more generally of modern Western society, for the essential character of human society. To avoid this danger, it is compelled to engage in “cross-cultural research,” in the study of other cultures, both present and past. But in making this effort, it misses the meaning of those other cultures, because it interprets them through a conceptual scheme which originates in modern Western society, which reflects that particular society, and which fits at best only that particular society" (Strauss, 1988, p. 25).

Presumably, if one takes into consideration these theoretical problems, it becomes hard to accept positivism as a viable option for social sciences. Even though it is still very popular among western academics. But as Strauss remarks, although „Positivism may be said to be more dogmatic than any other position of which we have records… It is able to present itself as very skeptical; it is that manifestation of dogmatism based on skepticism in which the skepticism completely conceals the dogmatism from its adherents" (Strauss, 1995, p. 26). It is precisely thanks to this veil of skepticism that positivism is still considered by many as the most reasonable and scientifically accurate viewpoint.