Monarchy & Democracy - Hans Herman Hoppe
Aug 28, 2022
Today, most of us have gotten used to considering Democracy as the best possible regime without ever questioning the validity of such a claim. And this is no surprise. Since after 1970 electoral democracies increased from about 35 to more than 110, what Samuel Huntington labeled as the “third wave” of Democratization. But should we celebrate this event as another step towards progress? There are thinkers, who recognize democratization as the opposite of progress, nay, as the greatest folly in human history. One among these thinkers is a famous German-American Libertarian, Hans Herman Hoppe.
Hoppe challenges the popular view taught in schools and standard textbooks, which presents democracy as the crowning achievement of human civilization. Opposite to this view Hoppe aspires to show that the centuries-long historical development of society from Aristocracy to Monarchy and from Monarchy to Democracy is nothing but a tale of progressive folly and decay. Indeed, Hoppe admits that the present world is richer than people were in the Middle-Ages and the following monarchical age. But not because of this development. “As a matter of fact” – says Hoppe – “the increase in social wealth and general standards of living that mankind has experienced during this time occurred in spite of this development, and the increase of wealth and living standards would have been far greater if the development in question had not taken place” (Hoppe, 2014, p.14).
In order to find reasons behind Hoppe’s hostile attitude towards democracy, one must look at his revisionist reconstruction of human history. Similar to classical contractual theory, Hoppe opens his analysis with the state of conflict. He remarks that the reason, why humans do not live in perfect harmony and are in dire need of natural authority, is the scarcity of goods. One wants to do X with a given good G and the other wants to do simultaneously Y with the very same good. And since the good is not superabundant both of them cannot use G for Y and X simultaneously. Thus they must clash and conflict arises.
But there is a way out of this conflict according to Hoppe, which consists in agreement on the facts. Namely, in agreement over who is the actual possessor of a given good i.e. who took first control of it. As Hoppe puts it: “if one can demonstrate that the good in question had been previously controlled by him and was taken away from him against his will and consent by the current possessor, then ownership reverts back to him and in the conflict between him and the actual possessor he is judged to be in the right” (Hoppe, 2014, p.15). Therefore, the source of actual conflicts lies not in the absence of law, but only in the absence of an agreement on the facts. This means that function of judges and conflict arbitrators consists not in law-making, i.e., legislating, but in “fact-finding and the application of given law to individual cases” (Hoppe, 2014, p.15), i.e. judging and executing. This remark will become very important later on when discussing Hoppe’s critique of state and Democracy.
Now, in order to settle the conflict, one needs lasting recognition and respect of this settlement by others. Thus he will eventually turn to natural authorities, to members of the natural aristocracy, to nobles and kings; to these who, Due to superior achievements of wealth, wisdom, bravery, or a combination thereof, come to possess more authority than others and whose opinion and judgment, therefore, commands widespread respect. Through selective mating and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance, such members of society often form noble families. It is to the heads of such families that men typically turn with their conflicts and complaints against each other.
This is how Aristocracy was born, which in Europe during the early middle-ages developed into a Feudal Monarchy and later into an Absolute Monarchy. Since, as Hoppe remarks, generally, in most cases of conflict, one would turn to the head of the noblest of families, namely, to a king. However, Hoppe adds that this must not mistake us into imagining king in Feudal Monarchy as having a monopoly on his position to judge. In modern imagination there are two very popular myths about Monarchy to be overcome: namely, that 1) king can make laws and 2) he is the ultimate arbiter of justice. In reality, according to Hoppe, “the king is supposed to only apply law, not make it” (Hoppe,2014, p.17). Since he is held to be under and bound by the same “good old law” as everyone else. As for the second myth, even though he is equipped with the status of an ultimate judge and peacemaker, “everyone remains free to select another judge, another noble, if he is dissatisfied with the king” (Hoppe,2014, p.17). For, as Hoppe remarks:
“The king has no legal monopoly on his position as judge, that is. If he is found to make law, instead of just applying it, or if he is found to commit errors in the application of law, i.e., if he misconstrues, misrepresents, or falsifies the facts of a given case, his judgment stands open to be challenged in another noble court of justice, and he himself can there be held liable for his misjudgment. In short, the king may look like the head of a State, but he definitely is not a State but instead part of a natural, vertically and hierarchically structured and stratified social order: an aristocracy” (Hoppe, 2014, p.17).
The same idea is held by James Burnham in his famous book “The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom”:
“Under feudalism there was no developed central state power each feudal lord claiming jurisdiction over his particular fiefs, vassals, and serfs, and acknowledging the authority only of his particular suzerain. The sovereignty of the medieval kings, therefore, was largely fictional except as it held over their immediate feudal domain, or as it might suit the interests of their feudal peers to collaborate with them. Until the 15th century, the attempts of the kings to consolidate a firm governmental authority always met a strong and on the whole successful resistance from the lords” (Burnham, 2019, p.32).
Alexis de Tocqueville goes even further in this regard claiming that:
“In the Middle-Ages, the inhabitants of each village had formed a community independent of their lord. The latter exploited their services, supervised them, governed them but they had exclusive common ownership of certain property. They elected their leaders and administered their own affairs democratically. You will see this old parish constitution in all those nations which had been feudal and in all those countries where nations had retained remnants of their legal systems. Traces of it are everywhere to be seen in England and it was still alive in Germany up to sixty years ago, as can be confirmed by reading the legislative code of Frederick the Great. Even in eighteenth-century France a few remains of it still existed” (Tocqueville, 2008, p.85).
All this will become more evident if we take into consideration the fact that during early medieval times kingship was gained not by birthright, but by the required consent of other nobles through an election.
Indeed, Feudal lords and kings profited off the special privileges, namely, they could tax inhabitants on their own land. Furthermore, at many places, under the feudal order, there sufficed the institution of serfdom. However, it must be noted, that “without consent, taxation was considered sequestration, i.e., unlawful expropriation” (Hoppe, 2014, 17). Which means that “feudal lords and kings could only “tax” with the consent of the taxed. Besides this, on his own land, every free man was as much of a sovereign, as the feudal king was on his” (Hoppe, 2014, 17). As for the serfdom, Hoppe remarks, the burden imposed on today’s modern so-called tax-serfs is way harsher than that imposed on the medieval serf.
Of course, Hoppe does not claim here that feudalism was the perfect political order. He is conscious that it was marred by many imperfections. However, this does not stop him from preferring it over Democracy. Hoppe firmly believes that feudalism surpasses Democracy in three major ways: 1) in Democracy legislative branch of government claims the right to make laws, which makes the idea of natural law meaningless; by changing universal and immutable principles of justice they happen to betray their very essence. Which concludes into inequality before the law, privileging so-called public officials. Following this, it is evident that 2) in Democracy the supremacy of and the subordination of everyone under one law is impossible. As for the 3) judicial branch of Democracy, establishing a territorial monopoly of ultimate judgeship, the state declares monopoly over executing justice and applying the law. Now if we remember what has been said by Hoppe about Feudalism, none of these charges against Democracy can be stated with regards to Feudal Monarchy. Quite the contrary, king 1) neither makes laws 3) nor establishes monopoly over Judgeship. Thus 2) the supremacy of universal law is preserved since the king too is “held to be under and bound by the same law like everyone else” (Hoppe, 2014, p.16).
However, it is fair to say that this critique does not refer specifically to Democracy, but to any form of State – including Constitutional and Absolute Monarchy. But Democracy specifically, on top of that, is characterized by one more major vice. While under Monarchy king owns the capital stock on “his” territory and must bequeath his realm to his heir or a successor of his choosing, in Democracy presidents, prime ministers, and members of parliament are merely temporary and interchangeable “caretakers” of the country. Thus the latter only owns its current use. This results in the Democratic government’s exploitation being shortsighted, present-oriented and uncalculating. Therefore, promoting capital consumption. Whereas, in contrast, the king will be comparatively future-oriented with regard to exploitation. “In order to preserve or enhance the value of his property, his exploitation will be comparatively moderate and calculating” (Hoppe, 2014, p.22). Since as I have already pointed out, unlike the Democratic government, he owns the capital stock on his territory. In other words, to put it in economic terms, the Democratic government has a high time preference towards the state, focusing substantially on the present and immediate future. Monarchy, on the other hand, has relatively low time preference, placing more emphasis on the further future. This is very natural since after leaving office in a Democratic state politician is almost completely free from any responsibility towards the state. Whereas, the monarch cares for the fate of his realm even after his death.
For the same reason, the king’s motives for war are typically ownership-inheritance disputes, thus their objectives are mostly tangible and self-evident, while under Democracy they are always purposefully veiled in ideology, thus, are vague, elusive, and intangible. In order to wage wars, the Democratic state makes a huge effort to present them as just and legitimate, waged on ethical and moral ground. Hiding public official’s actual interests and aims behind the ambiguous terms such as Freedom, Equality, Progress and etc. As Hoppe puts it:
“Democracy radically transforms the limited wars of kings into total wars. In blurring the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, democracy strengthens the identification of the public with the State. And once the State is owned by all, as democrats deceivingly propagate, then it is only fair that everyone should fight for their State and all economic resources of the country are mobilized for the State in its wars” (Hoppe, 2014, p.26).
Moreover, since the Democratic government cannot (and do not) claim the foreign territory as its “own” as a king can do, the motive for war instead becomes an ideological one — national glory, democracy, liberty, civilization, humanity. Thus Ideology becomes one of the most powerful weapons of the Democratic state since with the help of modern means of communications it can mobilize huge masses of people around the world. The purges and genocides of the 20th century are precisely the outcomes of such change. For if objectives of war become the victory of ideas, and the unconditional surrender and ideological conversion of the losers, the mass murder of civilians becomes necessary because one can never be sure about the sincerity of their conversion. This is why “the distinction between combatants and non-combatants becomes fuzzy and ultimately disappears under democracy” (Hoppe, 2014, p.26).
This disappearance of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is most clearly expressed in Lenin’s attitude toward the contained war of classical European international law, which is waged according to recognized rules between regular troops. Lenin calls it a mere play (igra). “Since, according to him, it is but a duel between cavaliers seeking their own satisfaction” (Schmitt, 2020, p.34). This is because, for Lenin, who is driven by Communist ideology, the enemy is not only an adversary with the uniform, insignia, and weapon openly and demonstratively displayed, but anyone who gets in the way of the communist revolution, be it a soldier or an unarmed civilian. Which, again, perfectly explains the mass shootings and exiles of citizens committed under Communist regimes. To reiterate Hoppe’s thesis, turning war from a dispute over ownership into an ideological conflict between nations, classes, races, or other political groupings typically leads to collateral damage and mass war involvement. As for the wars under Monarchy, “Public expects, and the kings always feel compelled, to recognize a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants and to target their war efforts specifically and exclusively against each other and their respective personal properties” (Hoppe, 2014, p.26). Since at the end of the day these wars are private conflicts between different ruling families.
Now the question arises: if feudal Monarchy is superior in so many major ways, how did it end up losing with Democracy? And how did we end up with more than 110 electoral democracies around the globe? Although Hoppe has a very interesting explanation with regards to this development, let us save it for another video. As for today, thank you for watching.
References
Burnham, J. (2019). The Machiavellians Defenders of Freedom. Henry Regnery.
Hoppe, H. (2014). From Aristocracy to Monarchy to Democracy: A Tale of Moral and Economic Folly and Decay. Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Schmitt, Carl. (2020). The theory of the Partisan. Antelope Hill.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. (2008). The Old Regime and the Revolution. Penguin Classics.
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