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Let us assume – Schmitt argues – that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable. The question then is whether there is also a special distinction that can serve as a simple criterion of the political and of what it consists. The nature of such a political distinction is surely different from that of those others. It is independent of them and as such can speak clearly for itself (Schmitt 2007, 42). The Political per se is often formulated as antitheses of other realms of thought such as morality, law, religion, culture and thus is deprived of its own essence. Hence Schmitt aspires to offer us ultimate, substantive criteria for the political that cannot be reduced to anything but itself. Criteria that is independent of any realm of thought and does not borrow itself from any other social domains.

This criterion – according to Schmitt -, this specific distinction to which any political action and motive can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.

“For as long as a people exist in the political sphere, this people must, even if only in the most extreme case (and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it), determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. Therein resides the essence of its political existence, its existence as a state. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically. If it permits this decision to be made by another, then it is no longer a politically free people and is absorbed into another political system. The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy” (Schmitt 2007, 57).

The enemy that has no mere normative meaning, but an existential meaning only, particularly in a real combat situation with a real enemy. The enemy, who is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general, but an enemy that exists only, when one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity, at least potentially.

This real friend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that the nonpolitical antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomes political, pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely economic, purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the political situation at hand.

However, this does not lead to the conclusion that religious, economic, cultural, or any other social matter cannot become political. Quite the contrary, “every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy” (Schmitt 2007, 49). Since political does not reside in the battle itself, which possesses its own technical, psychological, and military laws, but in the mode of behavior which is determined by this possibility, by clearly evaluating the concrete situation and thereby being able to distinguish correctly the real friend and the real enemy. For example, a religious community that wages wars against members of other religious communities or engages in other wars is already more than a religious community; it is a political entity.

Hence it follows that 1) only state has the authority to decide political matters, that is, determine the distinction of friend and enemy, and 2) war, or at least, the possibility of war is necessary for the political to exist. Thus through Schmitt’s political philosophy Heraclitus’s famous words - “war is the father of all and king of all” - take on an absolutely new meaning. On the one hand, the state represents the ultimate source of power, since it is preoccupied with the most decisive and fundamental question, namely, that of friend and enemy. But, on the other hand, this preoccupation, along with the state as such is only possible because of war that may be waged between friend-enemy groupings. In other words, as Schmitt puts it, “the political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy” (Schmitt 2007, 60) therefore presupposes the real possibility of war.

However, the question arises: what if a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of politics? Schmitt takes into account such states of affairs too. In this situation – according to him - another people will appear which will assume these trials by protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule. The protector then decides who the enemy is by virtue of the eternal relation of protection and obedience. To which he adds, No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without protection and obedience. A political theory which does not systematically become aware of this fact remains an inadequate fragment. As Schmitt remarks:

“Hobbes designated this as the true purpose of his Leviathan. Since he himself had experienced this truth in the terrible times of civil war because then all legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive themselves regarding political realities in periods of untroubled security vanish” (Schmitt 2007, 59).

References

Schmitt, C., & Schmitt, C. (2007). The concept of the political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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